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Casenotes
THE UNEQUAL PLAYING FIELD-EXCLUSION OF MALE
ATHLETES FROM SINGLE-SEX TEAMS: WILLIAMS v
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF BETHLEHEM, PA.*
I. INTRODUCTION
School athletic programs rarely satisfy the competitive desires
of every athlete. Rather, limited budgets and low levels of interest
in certain sports often result in schools creating single-sex teams in
particular sports.' At such a school, for example, male athletes in-
terested in playing a sport only offered to female athletes might
seek to join the girls' team. Would precluding boys from playing
on the all-female team constitute impermissible gender
discrimination?
Courts have consistently held that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment 2 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 19723 prohibit the exclusion of female athletes
from trying out for or participating on male athletic teams.4 This
precedent seemingly affords excluded male athletes a similar ave-
* The authors wish to express their appreciation to Mr. Ryan Bornstein for
his diligent editorial assistance without which this Casenote would never have been
possible.
1. Common examples include volleyball, field hockey and lacrosse.
2. U.S. CoNgr. amend. XIV.
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988).
4. See Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973)
(enjoining rule banning females from playing on male non-contact sport teams);
Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973) (enjoining
rule prohibiting females from playing on all-male tennis teams); Leffel v. Wiscon-
sin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (invalidating
rules denying females participation opportunities on male baseball teams); Hoover
v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977) (voiding rule limiting participa-
tion on soccer team to males); Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (striking rule prohibiting female participation
on male baseball team); Gilpin v. Kansas State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377
F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973) (invalidating rule forbidding gender integrated com-
petition); Reed v. Nebraska Sch. Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972)
(voiding rule banning females from participation with or against males in golf);
Haas v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972) (striking
rule prohibiting female participation in male non-contact sports team); Common-
wealth ex. rel. Packel v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839
(Pa. 1975) (invalidating rule banning female competition with or against male ath-
letes); Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975) (voiding rule forbidding female
participation on football team).
(99)
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nue to challenge gender-based restrictions. However, numerous
judicial interpretations have declined to extend similar anti-discrim-
ination principles to excluded male athletes.5
Williams v. School District of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,6 decided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, is among
those cases that effectively bar male participation on female athletic
teams.7 In Williams, Liberty High School offered a girls' field
hockey team without offering a corresponding boys' team.8 In the
absence of a boys' team, John Williams tried out and was selected
for the girls' field hockey team. 9 The School District of Bethlehem,
however, prohibited Williams from participating on the girls' field
hockey team due to a school district policy that limited team partici-
pation to female athletes.10 The Third Circuit reversed and re-
manded the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania's holding that the school district's policy violated Tide
IX and the Equal Protection Clause.
This Note commences with a brief analysis of Tide IX and the
Equal Protection Clause. Next, this Note analyzes prior cases ad-
dressing male participation on female athletic teams. This Note
concludes with an analysis of the Williams case and its impact on
athletic participation opportunities.
5. See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982)
(policy excluding males from female volleyball team was constitutional), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 1818 (1983); Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc.,
768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991) (rule excluding males from female hockey team
permissible under Title IX and Equal Protection Clause); Petrie v. Illinois High
Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855 (II1. App. Ct. 1979) (excluding males from female vol-
leyball team permissible under Fourteenth Amendment and state constitution);
B.C. v. Board of Educ., Cumberland Regional Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (rule excluding males from girls field hockey team valid
under Equal Protection Clause, state constitution and gender discrimination laws);
Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(excluding males from female teams is permissible under Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Forte v. Board of Educ., N. Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 431 N.Y.S.2d 321
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (excluding males from female volleyball team was legitimate
under Tide IX and state statute). But see Comes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic
League, 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1979) (Tide IX prohibits exclusion of males from
female teams when no male team exists), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir.
1979); Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 393
N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979) (Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment requires close
examination of rule limiting athletic participation solely by sex).
6. 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 689 (1994).
7. For a list of cases that bar male participation on female teams, see supra
note 5 and accompanying text.
8. Wiliams, 998 F.2d at 168.
9. Id. at 170.
10. Id
11. Id at 170-80.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Title IX
In 1972, Congress enacted Tide IX to eliminate gender dis-
crimination in educational programs and activities receiving federal
funding.'2 Title IX provides that "[N]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance."13 In 1975, the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (HEW) issued regulations specifically applying Title IX to
athletic programs at educational institutions.' 4 These regulations
provide that any educational institution receiving federal funds
must afford both sexes equal athletic opportunities and must ac-
commodate the interests and abilities of both female and male
athletes.15
Although Congress enacted Title IX to provide equal athletic
opportunities for both sexes, the regulations specify certain excep-
tions to this goal.16 The regulations interpreting Title IX, for exam-
ple, specifically permit schools to maintain single-sex teams in
12. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988). Title IX was enacted in response to hearings
on gender discrimination conducted by the House of Representatives Special
Committee on Education. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on H.R 16098
§ 805 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
Title IX is not the only statute prohibiting discrimination in athletics. Several
states have passed legislation specifically prohibiting gender discrimination in ath-
letics. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 126.21, 363.01 (West Supp. 1994); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 28A.85.010, 28B.100 (West 1989 & West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 228.2001 (West 1989).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
14. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1994). Section 106.41(a) provides:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or
otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic .... athletics
offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics
separately on such basis.
Id. § 106.41(a). Prior to the enactment of § 106.41(a) it was unclear whether Tide
IX applied to athletics. Jill K. Johnson, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current
Judicial Interpretation of the Standards of Compliance, 74 B.U. L. Rav. 553, 557 (1994).
This ambiguity resulted from the lack of legislative history concerning its applica-
bility to athletics. Thomas A. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX 46 Gao. WASH.
L. Rav. 34, 36 n.11 (1977) (noting only two references in legislative history con-
cerning application of Tide IX to sports).
15. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1994). Section 106.41(c) provides, in pertinent
part that, "[a] recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate,
club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members
of both sexes." Id.
16. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1994).
1995]
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contact sports.17 A contact sport is defined in 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (b)
as one in which the "purpose or major activity... involves bodily
contact."18 Section 106.41 (b) also specifically lists six sports as con-
tact sports. 19
The meaning of "contact sport" has been further defined by
judicial interpretation.2 0 Courts considering the issue of whether a
particular sport is a contact sport have interpreted the "major activ-
ity" language of section 106.41 (b) differently.21 Several courts have
concluded that bodily contact must be the major activity of the
sport in order for the sport to be classified as a contact sport.22
Other courts have stated that a sport can qualify as a contact sport
even if the bodily contact involved in the sport is merely
incidental.23
If the sport is not a contact sport and the athletic opportunities
of the excluded sex have been previously limited, then section
106.41 (b) requires a school to permit a member of the excluded
sex to try out for the single-sex team. 24 Courts have interpreted the
17. Id The relevant portion of § 106.41(b) states:
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph
(a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for
members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon com-
petitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a
recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members
of one sex but operates no such team for members of the other sex, and
athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously been lim-
ited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team
offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of
this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, foot-
ball, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which
involves bodily contact.
Id.
Section 106.41(b) also permits schools to maintain single-sex teams when se-
lection for team is based upon a competitive skill. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Section 106.41(b) states that boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey,
football and basketball are contact sports. Id.
20. See Williams, 998 F.2d at 172 (stating sport is contact sport if bodily contact
occurs and is expected); Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 768 F.
Supp. 951, 955-56 (D.R.I. 1991) (finding sport is contact sport even if bodily con-
tact is incidental). But see Gil v. New Hampshire Interscholastic Ass'n, No. 85-E-
646, slip op. at 4 (N.H. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1985) (determining sport not contact
sport if only "occasional forceful bodily contact and rigorous pitting of strength"
occur).
21. See, e.g., Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955-56; Gi/ No. 85-E-646, slip op. at 4.
22. See Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 799 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Pa.
1992), rev'd, 998 F.2d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 689 (1994); Gi4
No. 85-E-646, slip op. at 4.
23. Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 173 (3d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 689 (1994); Keczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955-56.
24. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
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phrase "limited athletic opportunities" in different ways. Most
courts have held that the regulations require an inquiry into the
overall limited athletic opportunities of the excluded sex, on either
a school or school district-wide basis.25 One court, however, has
interpreted this phrase to require an inquiry only as to whether the
excluded sex's opportunities have traditionally been limited in the
particular sport to which the excluded sex desires access. 26
The majority of courts have declined to hold that section
106.41 (b) mandates that male athletes have access to female ath-
letic teams. Currently, only one federal court has held that Title IX
allows males to play on female athletic teams. 27 In Gomes v. Rhode
Island Interscholastic League,28 the United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island issued a preliminary injunction en-
joining Rogers High School from denying Donald Gomes the op-
portunity to participate on the girls' volleyball team.2 9 The district
court held that the school district's policy excluding male athletes
violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. 30
The court construed section 106.41 (b) as requiring a sport-spe-
cific analysis. 31 Engaging in this analysis, the court found that the
athletic opportunities for male athletes had been limited because
Rogers High School had never sponsored a male volleyball team.32
25. Williams, 998 F.2d at 175; Keczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955; B.C. v. Board of
Educ., Cumberland Regional Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059, 1065 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987); Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461-63 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980); Forte v. Board of Educ., N. Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 431
N.Y.S.2d 321, 324 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
26. Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 664
(D.R.I.), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979).
27. Id. at 659.
28. 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I.), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979).
29. Id. at 666. Comes played on an all-boys volleyball team before transfer-
ring to Rogers High. Id. at 661. After transferring to Rogers High, Comes tried
out for and made the all-girls' volleyball team. Id. Comes was issued a uniform
and began practicing with the team prior to being dismissed by the Rhode Island
Interscholastic League. Id.
30. Id. at 664-65.
31. Id. at 664. The court stated that interpreting § 106.41(b) as requiring an
inquiry into the overall opportunities for males would violate the Equal Protection
Clause because such an interpretation would give the Interscholastic League the
power to establish female teams in any sport without establishing male teams sim-
ply because female athletes were discriminated against in the past. Id. The court
held that the Constitution prohibited "affirmative action" programs that absolutely
bar the other sex from participation. Id. (citing Regents of Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978)). Therefore, the court concluded that § 106.41 required the
Interscholastic League to either establish a separate team for boys or allow Gomes
to compete on the girls team. Id. at 665.
32. Id. at 661. In conducting a sport specific analysis, the court found that
although Rogers High School never sponsored a male volleyball team, it offered a
1995]
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Therefore, the court concluded that the policy violated Title IX be-
cause section 106.41(b) required that boys be provided access to
the girls' volleyball team.33
Moreover, the court also held that an absolute prohibition on
participation by boys in a particular sport violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.34 The court reasoned that the creation of an all-female
volleyball team was not directed toward rectifying past disadvan-
tages because girls had never been denied the opportunity to play
volleyball.35 The court, thus, found that the gender-based classifica-
tion was "impermissibly overbroad."3 6
In contrast to Gomes, most courts hold that Title IX does not
require that male athletes be able to participate on all-female
teams. In Mularadelis v. Haldane Central School Board,37 the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that the school
board's exclusion of a male athlete from the girls' tennis team did
not violate Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause.38 The court
rejected plaintiff's argument that under Title IX's regulations male
athletes must be allowed to try out for the female tennis team be-
cause male athletic opportunities in tennis had been traditionally
limited.3 9 The court interpreted section 106.41 (b) as requiring an
inquiry into overall athletic opportunities rather than a sport-spe-
cific inquiry.40 The court concluded that female athletes were enti-
tled to favored treatment because male athletes within the Huldane
Central School District had greater overall athletic opportunities
wide variety of athletic opportunities in other sports for male athletes. Id. The
court also recognized that males overwhelmingly constituted the majority of par-
ticipants on teams open to co-ed participation. Id.
33. Gomes, 469 F. Supp. at 665.
34. Id. at 664.
35. Id. The court determined the injustices to female athletes were in the
aggregate and not in the sport of volleyball. Id.
36. Id. The court acknowledged that a regulation which provided women
with separate and exclusive teams in sports previously dominated by men was a
legitimate and narrowly drawn attempt to rectify past discrimination. Id. The
court also stated that a policy which only offered women the choice to play on a
gender-integrated team or on a single-sex team was a valid way to enlarge opportu-
nities for female athletes and to redress past discrimination. Id.
37. 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
38. Id. at 463-64. The school policy stated that "[s]ince the opportunities for
girls to participate were more limited than for boys, the school district shall pro-
hibit the participation of boys on teams and in leagues organized to provide com-
petition among girls." Id. at 460.
39. Id. at 461. The court rejected the Gomes interpretation of § 106.41(b),
which looked at each sport individually to determine past discrimination. Id. at
461. For a full discussion of Gomes see supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
40. Mularadelis, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
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than females.41 The court also found that the school board's regu-
lation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the
school successfully sought to redress past discrimination. 42
In Forte v. Board of Education, North Babylon Union Free School Dis-
trict,45 the petitioner sought to invalidate the school district's regu-
lation banning participation of male athletes on the girls' high
school volleyball team.44 The Forte court declared the regulation
valid, holding that Title IX's regulations authorized the exclusion
of male athletes when the overall athletic opportunities of male ath-
letes had not been limited in the past.45
The court reasoned that the school district's regulation served
to prevent the displacement of female athletes by male athletes who
already had an advantage in overall athletic opportunities. 46 The
court also found that the regulation sought to redress past discrimi-
nation against female athletes. 47 Further, the court stated that the
lack of opportunities in volleyball for male athletes did not violate
Title IX because male athletes had significantly more opportunities
to participate in interscholastic athletics as a whole. 48
In Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc.,49 a male
athlete sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the high school
athletic association from denying him the opportunity to partici-
41. Id at 464. The court pointed out that opportunities for women were lim-
ited because the school offered 11 boys' teams and only 6 girls' teams. Id. at 461.
42. Id. at 464. The court held that precluding males from participating on
the girls' athletic team was a permissible means of rectifying past discrimination
against females in scholastic athletic programs. Id. The court determined that
"[n]otwithstanding the alleged favorable treatment granted female students
herein, the overall athletic opportunities at the appellants' schools for male stu-
dents will exceed those afforded their female counterparts. Special recognition
and favored treatment can constitutionally be afforded members of the female sex
under the circumstances." Id. (citations omitted).
43. 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
44. Id. at 322. Joanne Forte brought suit when her son was prohibited from
playing on the North Babylon High School's girls' volleyball team. Id. The school
only offered a female volleyball team. Id. Section 135.4(c) (7) (ii) (c) of the Regula-
tions of the Commissioner of Education stated that "inasmuch as boys have not
been denied an equal opportunity to participate on inter-scholastic sport teams in
past years in Suffolk County, boys may not try out nor participate on girls' inter-
scholastic teams in accordance with Federal Regulations." Id. at 323.
45. Id. at 323 (following the interpretation of Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent.
Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n,
394 N.E.2d 855 (IIl. App. Ct. 1979)).
46. Id. at 324.
47. Id. The court held that the resolution furthered the objectives of Title IX
and that the Title IX policy of barring males from female sports teams was proper
treatment to remedy past discrimination in athletics. Id.
48. Forte, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
49. 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991).
19951
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pate on the girls' field hockey team.50 Plaintiff argued that the ex-
clusion of male athletes from the girls' team violated Title IX and
the Equal Protection Clause.51 The district court denied plaintiff's
request for injunctive relief.52
The court held that plaintiff's Title IX claim failed.53 First, the
court considered whether under section 106.41 (b) athletic oppor-
tunities had been previously limited for male athletes at plaintiff's
high school.5 4 Under the court's limited athletic opportunity analy-
sis, it ruled that plaintiff's Title IX claim was meritless because only
opportunities for female athletes had been traditionally limited. 55
The court also determined that field hockey was a contact sport
because it involved incidental physical contact.5 6 Thus, under sec-
tion 106.41 (b), the association could sanction a single sex team and
prohibit the excluded sex from trying out for the team.5 7
50. Id. at 952. After making the girls' field hockey team, Brian Kleczek asked
for approval to play for both Kingstown High and the Rhode Island Interscholastic
League (RIIL). wId. at 953. RIIL would not allow Brian Kleczek to play because
Article 25 Section 1 of the RIIL's Rules and Regulations prohibited him. Id. The
rule "limits competition in field hockey to only girls." Id. (quoting RIIL Rules,
Article 25 § 1). This action began after the RIIL upheld this decision in a special
hearing requested by Brian's parents. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court found that plaintiff failed to make a Title IX claim. Id. at
953-55. The court found RIIL was outside the scope of Title IX because the athlet-
ics program received no federal money. Id. (receiving federal money specifically
to the athletic department is no longer required pursuant to the Civil Rights Resto-
ration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)). The court continued its analysis by
discussing whether Kleczek would win if RIIL was within the scope of Title IX. Id.
The court held that Kleczek would still lose because (1) males traditionally did not
have limited opportunities because of their sex and (2) field hockey was an inci-
dental contact sport similar to basketball. Id. at 955-56.
53. Id. at 953-55.
54. Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955. The court acknowledged that there was a split
among the courts' interpretation of 106.41(b). Id. The court followed the Mu-
laradelis Court's approach by interpreting the section broadly. Id. (stating Gomes
court's construction "disregarded the plain language of the regulation and substi-
tuted new language to avoid a feared constitutional problem"). For a further dis-
cussion of Gomes, see supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text. For a further
discussion of Mularadelis, see supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
55. K/eczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955. The court based its decision on evidence
introduced at the hearing, but it did not discuss this information in its opinion. Id.
The court inferred that the plaintiff would only be permitted the opportunity to
play if males previously had limited athletic opportunities. Id. However, the court
found that athletic opportunities for males were not previously limited. I.
56. Id. at 955-56. The court, relying on expert testimony presented by the
defendants, found that "the evidence presented to the court indicate [d] that field
hockey [ I in reality [was] [an] 'incidental contact' sport, more akin to basketball
than volleyball or tennis." Id.
57. Id. at 956. The court also rejected plaintiff's Equal Protection argument.
Id. The court found that there was a substantial relationship between the exclu-
[Vol. II: p. 99
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As these cases indicate, male athletes may not pursue a Title IX
claim demanding access to all-female teams. Courts have reasoned
that male athletes are not afforded Title IX protection because
male athletic opportunities have not been traditionally limited.5 8
Similarly, courts have found male athletes do not have a constitu-
tional right to participate on all-female teams.59
B. Equal Protection
Athletes also argue that exclusion from single-sex teams, based
on gender, is a violation of their constitutional rights.60 The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 61 prohibits cer-
tain gender-based classifications.62 In Craig v. Boren,63 the United
States Supreme Court held that gender-based classifications should
be analyzed under an intermediate level of scrutiny.64 The Court
sion of males from the team and the important government objective of redressing
past discrimination against female athletes. Id.
58. See supra notes 37-57 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
60. See Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 689 (1994); Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695
F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982); Keczek, 768 F. Supp. at 951; Gomes v. Rhode Island
Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I.), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st
Cir. 1979); Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979); Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 393
N.E.2d 284, 289-94 (Mass. 1979); B.C. v. Board of Educ., Cumberland Regional
Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059, 1062-66 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Mularadelis v.
Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Constitutional challenges are not
limited to those based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Several states have equal rights provisions within their constitutions. See,
e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20;
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18; MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art.
46; MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 28, TEx.
CONST. art. I, § 3a; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1.
63. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
64. Id. at 197; see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280-82 (1979); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974).
The Supreme Court has adopted three standards of review when determining
whether a classification conforms with the guarantees afforded by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. James Torke, The Judicial Process in Equal Protection Cases, 9 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 279, 282-83 (1982). The first standard of review is strict
scrutiny. Id. Regulations or laws that make "suspect classifications" or infringe
upon fundamental interests are subject to strict scrutiny. Id Such regulations or
laws must be necessary to promote a compelling state interest to satisfy Equal Pro-
tection requirements. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). "Suspect" classifi-
cations include alienage, race and national origin. Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (race); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin).
The second standard of review is intermediate scrutiny. Torke, supra, at 280-
82. Under this standard of review, regulations or laws must be substantially related
9
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stated that gender-based classifications must "serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives." 65 Thus, a school must demon-
strate an important governmental objective for excluding an athlete
from participation in a sport based solely on gender.66
Most courts have found two reasons important enough to jus-
tify single-sex participation in athletics: physiological differences be-
tween men and women 67 and past discrimination against female
athletes.68 Courts have found that excluding boys from participat-
ing on girls' teams is substantially related to achieving these impor-
tant governmental objectives. 69
The first permissible reason for denying males participation is
based on physiological differences between males and females. The
Supreme Court in Michael M. v. Superior Court" recognized that
classifications based on gender may be upheld if they are based on
"actual differences between the sexes, including physical ones. ' 71
Physiological differences are generally thought to be highly rele-
to important governmental objectives in order to pass constitutional muster. Craig,
429 U.S. at 197. Presently, gender, and illegitimacy are subject to this standard of
review. See, e.g, id. (defining intermediate scrutiny and application to gender);
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (applying intermediate scrutiny to illegitimacy).
The third standard of review is the rational basis test. Torke, supra note 280-
82. Under this standard of review, a classification need only be rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest. Mcdonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). Under a rational basis test, a classification will be upheld
unless it is patently arbitrary. Id.
65. Craig, 427 U.S. at 197.
66. See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1818 (1983); O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 545 F. Supp.
376, 378 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Israel v. West Va. Secondary Sch. Activities Comm'n, 388
S.E.2d 480, 484 (W. Va. 1989).
67. See Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131; B.C. v. Board of Educ., Cumberland Regional
Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
68. See Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131; Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic
League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991); Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 394
N.E.2d 855 (I1. App. Ct. 1979); Cumberland, 531 A.2d at 1065; Mularadelis v.
Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Forte v. Board of
Educ., N. Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
Regulations that maintain gender-based classifications solely for administrative
convenience or that reflect "archaic and overbroad generalizations" are constitu-
tionally invalid in that they do not serve an important governmental interest. See
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199, 216-17 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507-08
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76-77 (1971).
69. See Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131; Petri, 394 N.E.2d at 863.
70. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (holding rape statute ap-
plied singularly to men because only women were subject to pregnancy).
71. Id. at 478-81.
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vant to the performance abilities of female and male athletes.72
The average male is taller, heavier, stronger and may be more phys-
ically capable than the average female.73 Therefore, female ath-
letes are at a physical disadvantage in activities that involve speed,
strength or cardiovascular endurance.74 Clearly, these physical dif-
ferences could affect the competitive balance between the sexes if
they compete against the other.75 Thus, courts attempt to avoid
displacement or competitive imbalances by recognizing these physi-
cal differences.7 6
The second governmental objective accepted by the courts is
redressing past discrimination against female athletes. 77 Female
participation in interscholastic athletics has increased dramatically
in the last twenty years.78 Male athletic participation and opportu-
nities, however, continues to exceed the opportunities available to
women. 79 This disparity in athletic participation has led most
courts to deem the exclusion of male athletes as necessary in order
to redress past discrimination against females in interscholastic ath-
letic programs.80
72. Agnes Chrietzberg, EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY, BIOLOGICAL SEX DIF-
FERENCES, PHYSicAL EDUCATORS FOR EQurrY, Module 3, 3 (1981).
73. See Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 662
(D.R.I. 1979), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979); Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at
861.
74. Chrietzberg, supra note 73, at 3; cf. Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Inter-
scholastic Athletics Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d 284, 293 (Mass. 1979) ("The general male
athletic superiority based on physical features is challenged by the development in
increasing number of female athletes whose abilities exceed those of most men
and in some cases approach those of the most talented men.") (citations omitted).
Disparity in athletic ability may not only be attributed to physical differences.
See Polly S. Woods, Comment, Boys Muscling in on Girls' Sports, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 891,
895 (1992). Commentators suggest that some of the advantages of males over fe-
males in athletics is attributable to the lack of athletic opportunities available to
female athletes rather than a purely physical advantage. Id.
75. Woods, supra note 74, at 895. Not all women would be at a disadvantage.
Id. For example, female athletes that have been trained can attain a higher level of
physical performance than their male counterparts. Id.
76. See Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131; Cumberland, 531 A.2d at 1065.
77. See Clark, 695 F.2d at 1131; Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic
League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991); Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 394
N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Cumberland, 531 A.2d at 1065; Mularadelis v.
Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Forte v. Board of
Educ., N. Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
78. Jay P. Goldman, Leveling the Playing Field for Female Athletes: Title IX Brings
Equity to Sports, But Leaves Many Still Fighting, 48 SCH. ADM'R 20 (1991).
79. Id.
80. Cf Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393
N.E.2d 284, 296 (Mass. 1979) (contending "to immunize girls' teams totally from
any possible contact with boys might well perpetuate a psychology of 'romantic
1995]
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Male athletes have had very little success in challenging, on
constitutional grounds school district policies which bar male par-
ticipation on female athletic teams. Presently, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court is the only court to hold that the exclusion
of male athletes from female athletic teams is a constitutional viola-
tion.81 In Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n
(MIAA),82 the court held that a regulation prohibiting boys from
playing on girls' athletic teams violated the Equal Rights Amend-
ment to the Massachusetts Constitution.85 The court concluded
that "[c]lassification on strict grounds of sex, without reference to
actual skill differentials in particular sports, would merely echo
'archaic and overbroad generalizations.' "84 The court stated that
such a classification was impermissible unless it was justified by an
important governmental objective.8 5
Contrary to the holding in M[AA, most courts have held that
male athletes do not have a constitutional right to play on all-fe-
male athletic teams.86 For instance, in Petrie v. Illinois High School
paternalism' inconsistent with such development [of competitive athletics for
girls] and hurtful in the long run").
81. Id. at 295.
82. 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979).
83. Id. at 296. Rule 17 of the MIAA regulations states that "[w]ith due regard
to protecting the welfare and safety of all students participating in MIAA athletics:
(1) No boy may play on a girls' team; (2) A girl may play on a boy's team if that
sport is not offered in the school for the girl." I&. at 287.
84. Id. at 293 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)). In
support of the regulation, MIAA argued that the physical differences between the
sexes necessitated sex-based teams because it protected the athletes and preserved
athletic opportunities for women. Id.
The court recognized that physical differences may contribute to an overall
male advantage. Id. However, the court held that "physical differences were not
so uniform as to justify a rule that used sex as a 'proxy' for functional classifica-
tion." Id. The court emphasized that girls excelled, sometimes surpassing males,
in sports requiring balance and endurance. Id. Therefore, a classification based
solely on sex was overbroad because it excluded boys from playing on girls' teams
even though boys possibly were at a competitive disadvantage. Id. at 293-94. Ac-
cording to the court, less draconian measures could be used to classify eligibility
for high school sports teams. Id. at 295. The court suggested that the MIAA use
standards such as height, weight and skill or limit the number of boys allowed to
participate on all female teams. Id.
85. Id at 293. The court found that MIAA's safety and displacement concerns
were not important governmental objectives. Id, at 293-94. First, the court stated
that the connection between the presence of male athletes and injuries to female
athletes were tenuous and based on stereotypes that women were weak and physi-
cally inadequate. Id. at 294. Second, the court stated that protecting female ath-
letes from displacement due to superior athletic abilities of male athletes did not
justify the use of a gender-based classification. Id at 294-95.
86. See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982)
(policy excluding males from female volleyball team was constitutional); Kleczek v.
Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991) (rule
[Vol. II: p. 99
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Ass 'n,87 Trent Petrie was prohibited from participating on the high
school girls' volleyball team because the Champaign Community
Unit School District limited participation to girls.88 Petrie brought
suit against the Champaign School District alleging that the gender-
based classification violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and the Illinois Equal Rights Amend-
ment.89 The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit.90 The court
reasoned that the exclusion of male athletes from an all-female
team was a constitutionally permissible gender-based restriction be-
cause it maintained, encouraged and increased athletic opportuni-
ties for girls.91
The Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the
trial court's decision. 92 The court held that the Champaign School
District's gender-based participation restriction was constitutional
because it was based on natural physical differences between the
excluding males from female hockey team permissible under Title IX and Equal
Protection Clause); Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (exclusion of males from female volleyball team is permissible under Four-
teenth Amendment and state constitution); B.C. v. Board of Educ., Cumberland
Regional Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (rule excluding
males from girls' field hockey team was valid under Equal Protection Clause, state
constitution and gender discrimination laws); Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent. Sch.
Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (excluding males from female teams is
permissible under Fourteenth Amendment); Forte v. Board of Educ., N. Babylon
Union Free Sch. Dist., 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (excluding males
from female volleyball team was legitimate under Tide IX and state statute).
87. 394 N.E.2d 855 (111. App. Ct. 1979).
88. Id. at 856. Petrie began to practice and play on the girls' volleyball team,
but he was later informed by school officials that he could no longer play because
of the school district's participation restriction. Id. at 857. The high school associ-
ation restricted participation despite the apparent applicability of section 27-1 of
the school code which provided in part: "No student shall, solely by reason of the
person's sex, be denied equal access to physical education and interscholastic ath-
letic programs or comparable programs supported from school district funds." Id.
at 857.
89. Id. at 856. The Illinois' Equal Rights Amendment prohibits "the State or
its units of local government and school districts' from denying equal protection of
the law based on sex." Id. at 857 (quoting ILL. CONSr. art. I, § 18). The court
noted that under the Illinois Equal Rights Amendment, a gender-based classifica-
tion must withstand strict scrutiny. I&. at 857-58 (citing People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d
98 (1974)) (discussing legislative history of amendment).
90. Id. at 856-57.
91. I& Petrie conceded that the school district had a valid interest in main-
taining and increasing athletic opportunities for female athletes. Id. Plaintiff ar-
gued, however, that there was no important state interest in avoiding an imbalance
in competition based on male dominance in sports. Id. Plaintiff also argued that
the classification was both constitutionally overbroad and underbroad. Id.
92. Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at 862.
1995]
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sexes. 93  The court recognized that gender-based classifications
might be avoided by using weight, height or skill as qualifying fac-
tors for participating in a given sport.94 The court explained, how-
ever, that such standards would be too difficult to implement
because of the physical differences between the sexes.95 Gender-
based classification, according to the court, was the only viable sys-
tem which would advance the substantial state interest of promot-
ing equal athletic opportunities for female athletes.96
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reached a similar conclusion in Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic
Ass'7. 97 In Clark, a male athlete challenged an Arizona Interscholas-
tic Association (AA) regulation prohibiting boys from participating
on the girls' volleyball team, alleging that the regulation violated
the Equal Protection Clause. 98 The United States District Court for
93. Id Evidence was presented to the court demonstrating that high school
boys were substantially taller, heavier, stronger and had longer limbs than high
school girls. Id. at 861. Based on this evidence, the court concluded that high
school girls were at a substantial physical disadvantage in playing volleyball. Id.
94. Id. at 862.
95. Id. The court noted that the strength differentials would cause hardship
on tall girls because most high school girls would not have the musculature to
compete with taller boys. Id. The court also rejected a system of handicapping
because this type of rating players was too subjective and impractical. Id. Further,
the court concluded that handicapping was inconsistent with a system of full and
open competition. Id.
96. Id. at 862. The court conceded that the gender-based system was over-
broad and underbroad because it included females who were athletically superior
to males and excluded males who were "less well-endowed." Id.
Justice Craven, in his dissent, criticized the majority for failing to acknowledge
the federal court decision rejecting categorizations based upon outdated stereo-
types concerning the capabilities of the sexes. Id. at 865 (Craven, J., dissenting)
(citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)) (unwilling to uphold mandatory prefer-
ence for males as estate administrators). Justice Craven stated that the majority
was not attempting to protect girls from boys, but was trying to protect the weak
from the strong. I. at 866-67 (Craven, J., dissenting). Justice Craven concluded
that this position was erroneous given the fact that no attempt was made to protect
smaller and weaker females from competition with larger and stronger females.
Id. at 867 (Craven, J., dissenting).
97. 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. dnied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983).
98. Id. at 1127. The AIA's policy provided in pertinent part:
That the nondiscrimination policy of the A.I.A. permits participation by
girls on boys' teams in noncontact sports in order to compensate for the
girls' historical lack of opportunity in interscholastic athletics, however,
boys are not allowed to play on girls' teams in noncontact sports since
boys historically have had ample opportunity for participation and cur-
rently have available to them sufficient avenues for interscholastic partici-
pation, and since to allow boys to play on girls' teams in noncontact
sports would displace girls from those teams and further limit their op-
portunities for participation in interscholastic athletics.
Id. For a discussion on the issue of noncontact and contact sports, see supra notes
17-23 and accompanying text.
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the District of Arizona disagreed and granted summaryjudgment in
favor of the AIA.99
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of sum-
maryjudgment.100 The Ninth Circuit held that gender-based classi-
fications were constitutional if the classifications could be
supported by proof of physical differences between the sexes.101
The court found that the physical differences between male and
female athletes warranted the exclusion of males from all-female
teams. 10 2 The court explained that if male athletes were permitted
to participate on all-female teams, they would displace female ath-
letes and diminish female athletic opportunities.1 0 3 The court con-
cluded that the AIA regulation was substantially related to the AIA's
goal of creating equal participation opportunities for females in
athletics.1 04
99. Id. The district court held that excluding male athletes from participating
on the girls' volleyball team was "substantially related to and serves the achieve-
ment of the important governmental objective" of providing equal athletic oppor-
tunities for females in interscholastic sports and redressing past discrimination
against female athletes. Id.
100. Id. at 1127. Before considering whether Clark could be constitutionally
excluded from the girls' volleyball team, the court considered whether the AIA
regulations met the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id
at 1128. The court concluded that the activities of AIA were so "intertwined" with
the state that the regulations had to be considered state action. Id. The court
supported its conclusion by analyzing the relationship of AIA with the public
school system. Id. The court recognized that the public schools played a substan-
tial role in determining and enforcing the policies and regulations of ALA. Id. For
example, school administrators and coaches represented their schools on advisory
boards and the legislative council consisted of delegates elected by public schools.
Id. Further, the court noted that the rules promulgated by AIA were binding on all
public high schools in Arizona. Id. Lastly, the court noted that both athletic and
nonathletic activities authorized by the AIA occurred at public schools. Id.
101. Id at 1129 (citing Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981)) (up-
holding application of statute differently to women because only they are subject
to pregnancy); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (finding different pro-
motion systems for male and female naval officers constitutional because of exist-
ence of different opportunities for combat duty).
102. Clark, 695 F.2d at 1130 (citing Petrie v. Illinois High School Athletic
Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)).
103. Id at 1127. The court relied on a stipulation presented at trial stating
that physical differences, such as height and strength, existed between high school
males and females. Id The court noted that these differences were specifically
relevant to volleyball because basic skills such as hitting and blocking were en-
hanced by physical size, strength and vertical jump. Id. The court established that
males may dominate these two skills in volleyball due to their physical advantage.
Id,
104. Id. at 1131. The court recognized that excluding male athletes from all-
female teams was not the only way to equalize athletic opportunities. Id. The
court proposed several plausible alternatives: (1) participation could be limited on
the basis of height, weight or other physical characteristics; (2) a separate boys'
team could be provided; (3) junior varsity teams could be added; or (4) boys par-
1995]
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As these cases demonstrate, courts have interpreted that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and state
equal rights amendments do not prevent schools from excluding
male athletes from participating on all-female teams. The courts
have refused to extend these protections to male athletes based on
the historical disparate treatment of female athletes, the limited
athletic participation opportunities available to females and the
physiological differences between the sexes.
III. DISCUSSION: WILLIAMS V SCHOOL DISTRICT OF
BETHLEHFA', PA.' 0 5
A. Facts
In August 1990, John Williams tried out for the Liberty High
School girls' field hockey team.10 6 Williams made the team as a
goalie and began practicing with the junior varsity team.107 At the
end of August, the Bethlehem School District prohibited Williams
from practicing with the team or participating in team activities.' 08
The school district's rationale was that it limited participation on
ticipation could be limited on the girls' teams. Id. Despite the existence of these
alternatives, the court found that AIA's regulation was substantially related to the
achievement of its objective. Id. Although these alternatives existed, the court
held that a gender classification could be sustained. Id. (citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974)).
A similar result was reached in B.C. v. Board of Education, Cumberland Re-
gional School District, 531 A.2d 1059 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987). In Cumberland, a male
athlete claimed that a resolution prohibiting boys from participating on girls' ath-
letic teams violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1064-65. The court held
that the regulation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the regula-
tion promoted athletic opportunities for females and redressed past discrimina-
tion. Id. at 1065.
Relying on Clark and Petrie, the Cumberland court held that equalization of
athletic opportunities for females is an important governmental objective and that
the regulation prohibiting males from playing on female teams adequately pro-
tects the athletic opportunities for female athletes. Id. The court also accepted
the school district's argument that females would be displaced and female athletic
opportunities would be reduced if male athletes were permitted to play on all-
female athletic teams. Id. For a full discussion of Cumberland, see Lisa M. Rufolo,
Discrimination in High School Athletics-Court Prohibits Boys from Playing on Girls' Team-
B.C. on Behalf of C.C. Cumberland Regional School District, 220N.J. Super. 214, 531 A.2d
1059 (App. Div. 1987), 1 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 325 (1991).
105. 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 689 (1994).
106. Id. at 170. John Williams was not the only male student to try-out for the
field hockey team, in the summer of 1990. Id. Another male student tried out for
the team but was not a party to the action. Id. at 170 n.1.
107. Id. at 170. Williams previously played intramural coed field hockey in
junior high school, but the high school only had a girls' field hockey team. Id.
108. Id. After learning that Williams and the other male student had been
issued uniforms, school officials notified the coach that the boys were not permit-
ted to play on the field hockey team. Id.
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the girls' teams to female students. 10 9 Williams' parents filed suit
on his behalf in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania to challenge the school district's policy of
excluding male students from the girls' field hockey team.1 1 0
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.1
The district court held that the school district's policy violated both
Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Pennsylvania Equal Rights
Amendment (Pennsylvania ERA).' 1 2 The district court concluded
that the school district's policy violated Title IX because field
hockey was not a contact sport and the athletic opportunities for
boys had previously been limited in the Bethlehem School Dis-
trict.1 13 In addition, the district court also found that the school
district's policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because the
109. Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 799 F. Supp. 513, 514 (E.D.
Pa. 1992), rev'd, 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 689 (1984).
Male students were permitted to serve as non-playing managers and could act as
time-keepers and score-keepers. Id. at 514 n.1.
110. Id. at 514-15. On October 5, 1990, Williams' parents filed for a prelimi-
nary injunction and restraining order to have their son restored to the field hockey
team. Id. at 515. The court denied the preliminary injunction and temporary re-
straining order because plaintiffs failed to prove irreparable harm. Id. The case
prOceeded through discovery, and the parties reached a compromise agreement
r the 1991 field hockey season, which allowedJohn Williams to practice with the
team but not to play in the interscholastic games. Id. In order to ensure Williams'
participation in the 1992 season, plaintiffs filed for summary judgment. Id. Plain-
tiffs argued that the exclusion of male students violated Title IX, the Equal Protec-
tion and the Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment. Id.
111. Id. at 522.
112. Id. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
Section 1983 allows a private suit for damages to be brought against state or
local government officials who violate an individual's civil rights. Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding local government officials as
"persons" under statute); City of Greenwood, Mississippi v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808
(1966) (holding state officials as "persons" under statute).
113. Williams, 799 F. Supp. at 518. The district court found that field hockey
was not a contact sport under Title IX's implementing regulations. Id. at 517.
First, the court examined the definition of a "contact sport" found in § 106.41(b).
Id. at 515-17. For a further discussion of the regulation, see supra notes 17-26. The
court held that field hockey was not per se a contact sport because (1) field hockey
was not specifically listed in § 106.41(b) as a contact sport and (2) the national
17
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policy was not substantially related to achieving the school district's
goals of remedying past discrimination and maintaining equal ath-
letic opportunities for females. 1 4 The Bethlehem School District
appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.'1 5
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment on several grounds. 116 First, the Third Circuit held
that Title IX permitted a school to maintain single-sex teams." 7
field hockey rules prohibited bodily contact and bodily contact was not the "pur-
pose or major activity" of field hockey. Id. at 516-17.
The district court also concluded that athletic opportunities for boys had pre-
viously been limited in the Bethlehem School District. Id. In the 1970's, Liberty
High School attempted to comply with Title IX by establishing ten sports teams,
which were exclusively for girls, ten teams designated for boys but girls could try
out, and two coed teams. Id. The district court found that the athletic program
limited the athletic opportunities for boys in the Bethlehem School District. Id. at
518. The court based this conclusion on the fact that boys were only permitted to
try out for twelve teams, whereas girls could try out for twenty-two teams. Id.
114. Id. at 518-21. The court held that the school district's policy could not
be justified as a remedy for past discrimination. Id. at 519. The court declared
that a reasonable time-frame was needed as a reference for determining whether
past discriminatory practices justified the present policy. Id. The court stated that
"[f] or the current students of Liberty High School the years for which the school
district is still trying to make amends is equivalent to prehistoric times, since most,
if not all, of them were not then in existence." Id. Therefore, the court concluded
that because female athletes had not suffered discrimination in athletics in the
past eighteen years, a remedy for past discrimination did not presently constitute a
important governmental interest. Id.
The court also concluded that the school district's fear that the boys would
dominate the field hockey team was an insufficient justification for a policy that
discriminated against boys. Id. at 521. The court acknowledged that real differ-
ences between males and females had to be respected, but it stated that it would
not accept overbroad and unsupported generalizations regarding the athletic abili-
ties of boys and girls. Id. at 519. Further, the court found that the evidence
presented did not support the defendant's contention that the field hockey team
would be flooded by male athletes. I. at 521. The court found that in general
there was a lack of interest in playing on the girls' teams, such as field hockey,
among males at Liberty High School. Id.
Having concluded that the school district's policy violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the district court found that it was unnecessary to address Williams'
Due Process and Pennsylvania ERA claims in detail. Id. The court stated that the
school district's failure to afford Williams notice and an opportunity to be heard
before banning Williams from the team may have constituted a Due Process viola-
tion. Id. at 522. However, the court noted that without a judicial determination
that the policy was unlawful, Williams could not have obtained the type of relief he
was seeking. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that finding a Due Process viola-
tion would lead to an ineffectual remedy. Id. The court also concluded that if the
school district's policy violated the Equal Protection Clause it also violated the
Pennsylvania ERA. Id
115. Williams, 998 F.2d at 170.
116. Id. at 180.
117. Id. at 176. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's Title IX analy-
sis, see infra notes 124-46 and accompanying text.
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Second, the court found that Title IX's comprehensive scheme pre-
cluded consideration of plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim. 118 Fi-
nally, the court concluded that the Pennsylvania ERA permitted
schools to exclude male athletes from female athletic teams.119
B. Narrative Analysis
In Williams, the Third Circuit considered whether male ath-
letes have a right to participate on all-female athletic teams under
Title IX or the Pennsylvania ERA.120 First, the court discussed
whether single-sex teams were prohibited under Title IX. 12 ' Sec-
ond, the court examined the effect of Title IX's comprehensive en-
forcement scheme on plaintiffs' constitutional claims. 122 Finally,
the court evaluated plaintiffs' argument that the Pennsylvania ERA
forbids gender-based classifications in athletics. 123
The court began its analysis by rejecting plaintiffs' interpreta-
tion of Title IX's regulations. 2 4 Plaintiffs claimed that Title IX's
regulations precluded a school from maintaining a single-sex
team. 125 The court explained that the regulations did not require
schools to provide gender-integrated teams or the same choices of
sports to female and male athletes.' 26 Instead, the court explained
118. Id. The court of appeals vacated the district court's judgment on the 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on the United States Supreme Court's admonition that
courts should restrain from reaching federal constitutional claims. Id. For a fur-
ther discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of section 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see infra
notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 179. The court also remanded the Pennsylvania ERA claim for
further fact finding on whether genuine differences existed between boys and girls
to justify different treatment and whether boys would dominate the school's ath-
letic programs if allowed to join girls' teams. Id. For a further discussion of the
Third Circuit's discussion of the Pennsylvania ERA, see infra notes 150-60 and ac-
companying text.
120. Williams, 998 F.2d at 170.
121. Id. at 170-76.
122. Id. at 176.
123. Id. at 176-80.
124. Id. at 172.
125. Williams, 998 F.2d at 171-72. The plaintiffs specifically relied on
§ 106.41(b) which generates a general responsibility to make athletic teams open
to boys and girls. Id. at 171.
126. Id. at 172. The Third Circuit relied on Title IX which specifically allows
separate teams for each sex. Id. In addition, the court acknowledged two excep-
tions in Title IX, "contact sports" and historically limited opportunities for one
gender, which allows an institution to field a team for one gender only. Id. Also
the court relied on a Policy Interpretation which states "[in the selection of
sports, the regulation does not require institutions to integrate their teams nor to
provide exactly the same choice of sports to men and women." Id. (citing Title IX
of Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Inteipretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Ath-
letics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,417-18 (1979) [hereinafter Policy Interpretation]).
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that Title IX's regulations only require a school to effectively ac-
commodate the interests and abilities of both male and female ath-
letes.1 27 The Third Circuit closely examined the language in
section 106.41 (b). 128 The court found that section 106.41 (b) per-
mits schools to field separate teams for members of each sex when
either the sport is a contact sport or the excluded sex's athletic op-
portunities have been previously limited. 129
In its discussion of whether the district court properly classified
field hockey as a noncontact sport, the Third Circuit rejected the
district court's contention that field hockey was not a contact sport
as specifically identified in the regulations. 30 The Third Circuit
also rejected the district court's conclusion that field hockey could
not, as a matter of law, be a contact sport because the national field
hockey rules prohibit bodily contact. 31 Rather, the Third Circuit
focused on the definition of contact sport in section 106.41 (b).132
127. Id. The Third Circuit noted "[t]he touchstone of the regulation is to
'effectively accommodate [ ] the interests and abilities of male and female athletes'
so that individuals of each sex have the opportunity 'to have competitive team
schedules which equally reflect their abilities.' " Id. (quoting Policy InterpretatioT,
supra note 126).
Judge Scirica, in his concurring opinion, stated that the nature of field hockey
mandated that it be considered a contact sport. Id at 180-81 (Scirica, J., concur-
ring). Judge Scirica likened field hockey to basketball which is explicitly listed as a
contact sport in § 106.41(b). Id. (Scirica, J., concurring). Field hockey, like bas-
ketball, "forbid[s] a player from hold[ing], push[ing], tripting], [ ] or im-
ped[ing], the progress of an opponent." Id. at 180 (Scirica, J., concurring).
However, as Judge Scirica noted, the fact that this contact is penalized has little
relevance to § 106.41(b) because the contact still occurs. Id (Scirica, J., concur-
ring). Further, Judge Scirica found that the major activities of field hockey, en-
tailed running, advancing the ball, checking, shooting and blocking, all involve
bodily contact. Id. at 181 (Scirica, J., concurring). Therefore, Judge Scirica con-
cluded that field hockey was a contact sport because its major activity involved
bodily contact. Id. (Scirica, J., concurring).
128. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the "contact sport" exception is the
broadest exception to Title IX's goal of equal athletic opportunity. Id. at 172.
129. Id. at 172-76.
130. Williams, 998 F.2d at 173. The district court concluded that field hockey
was not a contact sport because field hockey was not one of the six sports specifi-
cally mentioned in § 106.41(b). Id.
131. Id. The district court considered the testimony of six experts in deciding
whether field hockey was a contact sport. Id. at 172-73. Four experts testified for
the plaintiffs stating that field hockey was not a contact sport. Id. at 172. "[T]hese
experts relied on the rules of play for field hockey promulgated by the National
Federation of State High School Associations, which provide that almost all bodily
contact or threatened bodily contact between players is a violation or foul." Id.
The two defense experts relied on the nature of the sport and concluded that it
involved significant bodily contact. Id.
132. Id. at 172-74.
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The court concluded that field hockey's purpose, "unlike box-
ing, wresting or football," did not involve bodily contact. 33 There-
fore, the court next analyzed whether bodily contact was a "major
activity" in field hockey under section 106.41 (b).134 In its analysis,
the Third Circuit rejected the district court's interpretation that
bodily contact must be the "major activity" of field hockey and a
sanctioned activity of the sport.8 5 Instead, the court determined
that under the "major activity" prong, a sport may be found to be a
contact sport when bodily contact occurs and is expected to oc-
cur. 13 6 The Third Circuit rejected the district court's holding that
field hockey was a contact sport, as a matter of law.' 37 Rather, it
held that there was sufficient evidence on the record to preclude
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.' 3 8
The court next considered whether the athletic opportunities
for male athletes had been traditionally limited at Liberty High
School. 3 9 The court dismissed plaintiffs' contention that the focus
of this inquiry should be sport-specific. 140 The Williams court stated
133. Id. at 173. Both parties agreed that field hockey's purpose does not in-
volve bodily contact. Id.
134. Id.
135. Wi//iams, 998 F.2d at 173-74. The Third Circuit specifically disagreed
with the district court's holding that "major activity suggests that bodily contact can
be deemed a 'major activity' of a sport only if it is a sanctioned activity." Id. at 173.
136. Id. at 173. The court explained that in determining whether contact was
likely to happen it is necessary to examine the rules of field hockey. Id. The court
stated that contact was expected because the rules "require[d] mouth protectors
and shin guards, prohibit spiked shoes, require that artificial limbs be padded, and
prohibit wearing jewelry." Id. The court also relied on Kleczek v. Rhode Island
Interscholastic League Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991), as precedent for its
condusion that field hockey is a contact sport. Id. For a full discussion of Keczek,
see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
137. Id. at 173-74.
138. Id. The Third Circuit distinguished its decision in Wi//iams from the
Keczek decision because the K/czek court determined that field hockey was a con-
tact sport as a matter of law. Id. at 173. The Third Circuit further stated that its
holding, on the issue of summary judgment, was limited to determining the exist-
ence of material facts sufficient to create a factual dispute as to whether field
hockey is a contact sport and preclude judgment as a matter of law. Id.
139. Id. at 174. The court noted that if field hockey were a contact sport, it
would not need to inquire into whether athletic opportunities existed for male
athletes. Id. Such an inquiry would not be necessary because a school can main-
tain single-sex teams if the sport is a contact sport. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1994).
However, because of its limited review, Williams was before this court solely on
appeal for summaryjudgment. Williams, 998 F.2d at 171. Therefore, it is the role
of the court to determine if there is any aspect of the district court's decision
which is a material fact and not a matter of law. Id.
140. Wiliams, 998 F.2d at 174. Plaintiffs argued that in a Title IX analysis it is
necessary to inquire if one gender has had limited participation opportunities in
that particular sport. Id. In this case, the plaintiffs argued that historically boys
have had limited opportunities to participate in the sport of field hockey. Id.
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that the broad language in section 106.41 (b) required a court to
focus on athletic opportunities generally afforded to the excluded
sex.'41 Further, the court maintained that if Congress had in-
tended the inquiry into athletic opportunities to be sport specific, it
would have expressly provided this in the regulation. 142
The Third Circuit further concluded that the district court
erred in holding that, as a matter of law, athletic opportunities for
boys at Liberty High School were previously limited. 143 The district
court concluded that opportunities for male athletes were limited
because male athletes, were only allowed to try out for twelve of the
twenty-two Liberty High School teams, while females were permit-
ted to try out for all twenty-two teams. 144 The Third Circuit con-
cluded that the opportunities for male athletes were limited only if
there were no meaningful physiological differences between boys
and girls of high school age. 145 The court reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further fac-
tual development because conflicting evidence was introduced by
the parties on this issue.146
The second issue addressed by the Third Circuit was whether
plaintiffs could pursue their constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.147 The court stated that when a federal statute provides its
141. Id.
142. Id. The Wiliams court acknowledged a split among the courts on this
issue. Id. The Third Circuit found the analysis in Mularadelis v. Haldane Central
School Board, 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) to be the most persuasive.
Id. In Mularadelis, the court determined that Congress would have specifically in-
cluded the language "particular sport" in the second clause of § 106.41(b) had
they intended the inquiry to be sport specific. Id. But see Gomes v. Rhode Island
Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D.R.I.) (finding Title IX violation
occurred at school which only offered volleyball to females), vacated as moot, 604
F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979). For a full discussion of Mularadis, see supra notes 37-42
and accompanying text. For a full discussion of Gomes, see supra notes 28-36 and
accompanying text.
143. Williams, 998 F.2d at 174.
144. Id. at 175. The school district allowed females to try out for all the sports
because their gender previously had "limited athletic abilities." Id.
145. Id. The defendants argued that these physical differences gave boys an
advantage in high school athletics. Id. (discussing expert testimony submitted by
both plaintiff and defendant concerning physical characteristics of boys and girls
in high school).
146. Id. Although the court remanded the case to the district court for fur-
ther factual development on the issue of limited athletic opportunities for male
athletes, the court noted that plaintiffs probably would not succeed on this claim
because "it would require blinders to ignore that the motivation for promulgation
of the regulation ... was the historic emphasis on boys' athletic programs to the
exclusion of girls' athletics programs." Id.
147. Id. at 176. For the text and discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see supra note
112 and accompanying text.
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own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the remedies of that
scheme may not be bypassed by bringing suit under section 1983.148
Thus, the court determined that Title IX's comprehensive enforce-
ment scheme supplanted any remedies available under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.149
The Third Circuit concluded by evaluating plaintiffs' claim
under the Pennsylvania ERA. 150 The school district argued that its
gender-based rule was necessary to achieve its goal of promoting
athletic opportunities for female athletes and to redress past dis-
crimination. 151 Additionally, the school district argued that the
physical differences between the sexes warranted the use of the clas-
sification because boys were likely to displace girls from field
hockey teams. 15 2
The court interpreted the Pennsylvania ERA as permitting dif-
ferential treatment based on gender, if the treatment was founded
on the physical characteristics unique to one sex.153 Based on this
interpretation, the court determined that the legality of the school
district's policy depended upon whether there were actual physical
differences between the sexes that warranted disparate treatment
148. Williams, 998 F.2d at 176. The court relied on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1981), which held that when statutes contain enforcement provi-
sions, a course of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be pursued. The court
also followed its own ruling in Pfeiffer v. Marion Central Area School District, 917
F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990), which denied plaintiff the right to pursure constitu-
tional claims while pursuing a Tide IX claim. Williams, 998 F.2d at 176.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 176-78. The Pennsylvania ERA states that "[elquality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania because of the sex of the individual." Id. at 177 (quoting PA. CONsT. art. I,
§ 28). The district court in this case analyzed the school policy under the Equal
Protection Clause without regard to the Pennsylvania ERA because it determined
that, if the school policy failed the Equal Protection Clause, it would also fail the
Pennsylvania ERA. Id. Therefore, once the district court found the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was violated, it assumed the school district also violated the Penn-
sylvania ERA. Id. The Third Circuit did not address this aspect of the court's
holding. Id.
151. Id.
152. I at 178.
153. Williams, 998 F.2d at 177-78. The Third Circuit asserted that the Penn-
sylvania ERA would be violated if the gender-based classification was grounded on
impermissible assumptions and stereotypes about the athletic abilities of males and
females. Id. (citing Bartholomew ex rel. Bartholomew v. Foster, 541 A.2d 393, 397
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (holding gender classification only allowable when based
on genuine physical characteristics unique to one sex), aff'd without opinion, 563
A.2d 1390 (Pa. 1989). The court concluded, however, that if real physical differ-
ences existed between boys and girls then the single-gender teams would be per-
missible under the Pennsylvania ERA. Id.
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by gender.154 The court stated that if there were real physical dif-
ferences, then the sexes were not similarly situated and the school's
classification was not prohibited by the Pennsylvania ERA. 155 Fur-
ther, the Third Circuit stated that the issue of physical differences
between the sexes must be resolved by the district court before any
determination could be made of whether female athletes would be
displaced by male participation on the field hockey team. 156
The court concluded that ultimately the validity of the Bethle-
hem School District's classification "would depend on the relation-
ship between the classification and the governmental interest." 57
Adopting a strict level of scrutiny,158 the court held that the school
district would have to show that its rule bears a necessary relation-
ship to a compelling state interest. 159 The court found that the
need to rectify past inequality in interscholastic athletic opportuni-
ties for female students was a compelling state interestjustifying the
school district's policy of limiting the field hockey team to girls.160
C. Critical Analysis
Although Williams did not decide the merits of plaintiffs'
claims, the Third Circuit seemed to align itself with the majority
view that male athletes do not have a right under Title IX to partici-
pate on female athletic teams. The Third Circuit also appeared to
reinforce the view that constitutional protections do not extend to
male athletes. The Third Circuit, however, differentiated their
holding by precluding plaintiffs from simultaneously pursuing a
possible remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Title IX claim. 161
The Williams court's interpretation of Title IX is consistent
with previous judicial interpretation and with congressional intent.
154. Id. at 178.
155. Id. The Third Circuit stated that "the E.R.A. does not prohibit differen-
tial treatment among the sexes when ... that treatment is reasonably and genu-
inely based on physical characteristics unique to one sex." Id. (quoting Fischer v.
Department of Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985)).
156. Id. at 179.
157. Id. The Third Circuit noted that this issue depended on what level of
scrutiny was applied. Id. The level of scrutiny will determine how narrow the rule
must be to remain valid under the Pennsylvania ERA. Id.
158. Wd/iams, 998 F.2d at 177. The Third Circuit adopted the strict scrutiny
standard of review because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not decided the
level of scrutiny under the Pennsylvania ERA. Id.
159. Id. at 179.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 176. The Third Circuit is the only circuit to find that Title IX
subsumes a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.; see Pfeiffer v. Marion Cent. Area
Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990).
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The court, like the majority of the courts considering this issue,
concluded that section 106.41 (b) requires an inquiry into the over-
all athletic opportunities of the excluded sex and a broad definition
of the term "contact sport."162
The Third Circuit remanded the issue of whether boys and
girls at the high school age are physiologically different. 163 The
court stated that such a finding was needed in order to determine
whether the overall athletic opportunities for male athletes at Lib-
erty High School had been previously limited.164 The Third Cir-
cuit's focus on overall athletic opportunities is consistent with Title
IX's purposes and the intent behind section 106.41 (b). Congress
enacted Title IX to promote overall equal athletic opportunities for
both sexes.1 65 This intent is evidenced by the exclusion of the
words "particular sport" as a modifier for the words "athletic oppor-
tunities" in the second clause of section 106.41 (b).166 Therefore,
the Third Circuit correctly concluded that section 106.41(b) re-
quires an inquiry into the overall athletic opportunities for the ex-
cluded sex.
Similarly, the Third Circuit's broad interpretation of the term
"contact sport" is also consistent with the holding of a majority of
the courts and congressional intent. The Third Circuit's rejection
of the district court's conclusion that field hockey is a noncontact
sport as a matter of law, was soundly based on the plain meaning of
the regulation. The focus of the regulation is clear: if a sport's pur-
pose or major activity involves physical contact, then that sport is a
162. Williams, 998 F.2d at 173. See also Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic
League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991); B.C. v. Board of Educ., Cumberland
Regional Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Mularadelis v.
Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Forte v. Board of
Educ., N. Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
163. Williams, 998 F.2d at 175.
164. Id. at 175. If physical differences exist, according to the court, then
under Title IX, exclusion of male athletes is justified as giving women athletes a
chance to try out for a greater number of teams. Id. The court reasoned that a
finding that males are physically superior at the high school level would "negate
the significance of allowing girls to try out for boys' teams but not allowing the
reverse." Id. If such disparity existed then the greater try out rights of the girls
would only be illusory athletic opportunities because girls would not, in most in-
stances, displace any boys from teams. Id.
165. See Cumberland, 531 A.2d at 1069.
166. See Mularadelis, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 461-62. The court in Mularadelis noted
that had Congress intended the limitation to refer to a particular sport, then it
would be reasonable to assume that the following language would have been incor-
porated: "athletic opportunities [in such sport or particular sport] for members of
[the excluded] sex have been limited" or "athletic opportunities for members if
[the excluded] sex have previously been limited [in a particular sport or in such
sport]." Id. (bracketed language added by the court for illustration).
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contact sport.16 7 Section 106.41 (b) specifically lists basketball as a
contact sport.168 By listing basketball as a contact sport, Congress
indicated that "bodily contact" need not be the "major activity" of a
sport in order for that sport to qualify as a contact sport.169 The
Williams court's broad definition of "contact sport" is, thus, consis-
tent with the plain language of section 106.41 (b) and the underly-
ing congressional intent.
The Third Circuit's interpretation that gender-based classifica-
tions are valid under the Pennsylvania ERA is consistent with other
courts that have interpreted state equal rights amendments. The
Third Circuit stated that the issue of whether there are physical dif-
ferences between girls and boys was also dispositive of whether dif-
ferent treatment was warranted under the Pennsylvania ERA.170 In
interpreting the Pennsylvania ERA to allow gender-based classifica-
tions, the Williams court concurs with the majority of courts that
deem gender-based classifications as permissible means of preserv-
ing athletic opportunities for women and addressing past
discrimination.171
The Third Circuit, however, distinguishes its holding by con-
cluding that Title IX's comprehensive scheme precludes an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.172 No other circuit has specifically pre-
cluded an Equal Protection claim in favor of a Title IX claim.
Under the Third Circuit's holding, all athletes are prohibited from
bringing section 1983 claims concurrently with claims under Tide
IX. Thus, this decision forces plaintiffs to choose between Title IX
and section 1983 causes of action.
167. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1994).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Wi//iams, 998 F.2d at 179-80.
171. See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1818 (1983); Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League,
Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991); Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d
855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); B.C. v. Board of Educ., Cumberland Regional Sch. Dist.,
531 A.2d 1059 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent. Sch.
Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div. 1980); Forte v. Board of Educ., N. Babylon Union
Free Sch. Dist., 431 N.Y.S.2d 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). Contra Gomes v. Rhode
Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1979), vacated as moot, 604
F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979); Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979).
172. Wi//iams, 998 F.2d at 176. "Where a federal statute [such as Title IX]
provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, Congress intended to fore-
close a right of action under section 1983." Id. (citing Middlesex County Sewer-
age Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1981)).
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IV. IMPACT
The Williams decision effectively bars male athletes from chal-
lenging their exclusion from all-female teams in the Third Circuit.
The court's holding also furthers the incongruence between the lit-
eral meaning of Title IX, the Equal Protection Clause, the Penn-
sylvania ERA and judicial interpretations construing these laws as
favoring only female athletes.
The Williams court's interpretation that section 106.41(b) re-
quires an overall, rather than a sport specific inquiry into limited
athletic opportunities, will cripple claims by male plaintiffs. Ex-
cluded male athletes will find difficulty demonstrating that their
overall opportunities to participate in athletics have been tradition-
ally limited. 173 Male athletes will not be able to demonstrate lim-
ited athletic opportunities because there is a high improbability
that females and males on the high school level will ever be found
to be physically equal.
The court's definition of "contact sport" as any sport where in-
cidental physical contact occurs and is foreseeable, greatly expands
the contact sports exception. Few sports qualify as noncontact
sports under the Third Circuit's interpretation because most team
sports involve some degree of bodily contact.174 While a broad defi-
nition would certainly protect female opportunities to compete on
all-female teams, it may also produce a negative affect in the future.
Just as a broad interpretation of contact sport serves to exclude
males from participation on all-female teams, a broad interpreta-
tion could be asserted to exclude female athletes from participating
on all-male teams. Thus, the Third Circuit's interpretation of sec-
tion 106.41 (b) could ultimately decrease athletic opportunities.
The Third Circuit's decision in Williams also provides guidance
to school districts and interscholastic athletic associations in formu-
lating policies to exclude male athletes from all-female teams.
When drafting a policy excluding male athletes from noncontact
sports, the school district or athletic association need only justify
the exclusion by explaining that the purpose behind the policy is to
provide female athletes with athletic opportunities that have histori-
173. See K/eczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955; Mularadelis, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
174. Most team sports involve some degree of bodily contact at some point in
the game. For example, there is bodily contact between baseball players when one
player slides into a base and another player attempts to tag the player out. There is
substantial bodily contact between soccer players as they fight for the ball, jump for
the ball or attempt to kick the ball. Similarly, volleyball players are often in physi-
cal contact as players on both sides of the net jump simultaneously for the ball and
attempt to hit it over.
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cally been denied. By deferring to such a justification, the Williams
court established that this policy will generally withstand scrutiny
under Title IX and the Pennsylvania ERA in the Third Circuit.
Male athletes are, thus, effectively foreclosed from asserting a
right to participate on any all-female team in the Third Circuit.
Therefore, the challenge for schools and interscholastic athletic as-
sociations is to find alternatives ensuring that both sexes are given
an equal opportunity to compete in athletics. Several courts and
commentators have proposed that athletes be selected solely based
on athletic ability.175 Given the physiological differences between
the sexes, that approach could result in displacement and constric-
tion of athletic opportunities for female athletes. 176
Relief for male athletes who wish to participate in a sport of-
fered only to females may not be available after the Third Circuit's
decision in Williams. A majority of courts concur that neither Title
IX nor various constitutional provisions give excluded male athletes
a right to participate on a female team. Thus, a male athlete inter-
ested in participating in a sport offered only to females must look to
alternatives, such as other school districts or leagues to satisfy his
desire to compete in that sport.
Renee Forseth
Walter Tolivey**
175. See Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393
N.E.2d 284, 295 (Mass. 1979); Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 394 N.E.2d 855
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979). See also Virginia P. Croudace & Steven A. Desmaris, Where the
Boys Are: Can Separate Be Equal in School Sports?, 58 So. CAL. L. REv. 1425, 1455
(1985).
176. Croudance & Demaris, supra note 175, at 1457.
** B.S., 1991, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1994, Villanova University
School of Law. Walt Toliver is an Associate at the Law Firm of Bradley & Bradley.
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